Military Intervention and Prospects for Democratization by Pearson, F.S. et al.
 MILITARY INTERVENTION AND PROSPECTS  
FOR DEMOCRATIZATION  
(Forthcoming in International Journal for Peace Studies) 
 
Frederic S. Pearson 
Wayne State University 
Scott Walker 
University of Canterbury 
Stephanie Stern 
Wayne State University 
Abstract 
Even before the Iraq war of 2003, a body of literature was developing concerning the 
possibility of implanting democracy in developing states.  Recent works by Mark Peceny 
(1999a and 1999b) suggest that those U.S. military interventions that specifically 
promote "free and fair elections" have frequently resulted in remarkably resilient new 
democracies. We empirically evaluate the track record of liberalizing interventions, 
focusing on countries Peceny deems to be cases of successfully imposed democracy. We 
find that when factors such as human, political, and civil rights, as well as judicial 
independence are used as measures of democratic success, the “forcing them to be free” 
strategy does not clearly emerge as an agent for democratic transformation.   
____________________________ 
 
 
 
Introduction 
The idea of external imposition of democracy goes back to the origins of liberal 
theory in international politics, and has been especially prevalent in U.S. foreign policy 
making. Examples include Woodrow Wilson’s attempts to draw “self determination” 
maps for Eastern Europe following World War I, the Kennedy-Johnson forceful “nation-
building” strategies in Vietnam, and, more recently, George W. Bush’s apparent belief 
that Iraq and Afghanistan can be remade in a Western democratic image.  This is not to 
say, of course, that U.S. action has always matched its rhetoric or that there has been 
consistent support for democracies over autocracies.  In U.S. policy, lip service is 
frequently paid to democratization, as in Kennedy-Johnson’s Alliance for Progress in 
Latin America and Clinton Administration preferences for “big emerging markets,” but 
when put to the test it is not always clear that democracy is the top U.S. priority.  How 
sincerely would Washington abide by democratic principles if free elections brought a 
confirmed or alleged “leftist” to power (e.g., Chile and Dominican Republic during past 
 decades), or an Islamic theocracy (e.g., Algeria), or even an assertive nationalist (e.g., 
Iran in 1953, Haiti)?  It has been argued that American preference for democrats gives 
way to acceptance of autocrats before acceptance of radicals (Barnet, 1968).               
Even taking U.S. policy at face value, however, determining the effectiveness of 
democratic implantation is complicated by a number of factors, including uncertainty 
over what causes political changes in developing states, definitions of what constitutes 
“democracy,” and confusion about the underlying goals of the intervening power. The 
growth of democracy has always been a complicated historical process, with periods of 
advancement and retrenchment, of war and peace (witness America's own civil war), and 
the development of key social and economic underpinnings such as the rise of middle 
classes.1  
Challenging this complex evolutionary view of democratization, Marc Peceny 
(1999) and others (Hermann and Kegley, 1996; Meernik, 1996; Peceny and Pickering, 
2002) argue that certain types of intervention can hasten the process. Specifically, Peceny 
believes that U.S. military interventions, through direct use of force, indirect military 
support, appear to have substantially improved the democratic standing of the states 
receiving the interventions. A number of these studies measure democracy along the 
dimensions of the Polity III or IV data set devised by Gurr and colleagues (see Jaggers 
and Gurr, 1995), which gauges general political openness through the institutionalization 
of free elections or executive change mechanisms, functional checks on executive power, 
and competitive political parties.  For instance, using Polity data Hermann and Kegley 
1996 find that intervention increases liberalization in states receiving the intervention.  
However, while the authors detect a move toward democratization, the mean Polity IV 
scores for these target states on a combined democracy-autocracy scale remain on the 
autocratic side, indicating that democratic improvement does not necessarily translate to 
a high level of democracy.  
Peceny goes a step further by dichotomizing intervention outcomes as being 
either democratic or non-democratic.  Peceny's (1999b) analysis suggests that U.S. 
military intervention tends to bring improvement in the target states at a level above what 
would be considered minimum for democratic standing. Indeed, Peceny even argues that 
the democratic changes wrought by military intervention have been long-lived and 
persistent over a 60-year period.  Further weight is lent to the forced democracy argument 
by the case studies presented by Peceny’s book (1999a).  He argues that in some cases 
(e.g., Cuba 1899-1902), U.S. reformist pressure was applied and effective while in others 
it either was not applied or failed (e.g., Philippines where counter insurgency was 
employed instead of liberalization and South Vietnam where liberalization was aborted in 
a series of U.S. sponsored coups).2   The implication, then, is that the type of strategy 
used after intervention makes a difference in the long-term prospects for democratization 
in a particular country.   
The message one can take from Peceny's findings, taken as a whole, is that a 
powerful country (in this case, the United States) can, through military intervention, 
“force” states to be “free,” or at least “freer.”  This would appear to open policy relevant 
 options for powers purportedly seeking to promote democracy abroad, such as in the 
recent cases of Iraq or Afghanistan.  However, while US interventions that push for 
democracy may be likely to result in movements toward democracy in certain countries, 
we note several potential shortcomings of the liberalizing intervention prescription for 
successful democratization.  First, Peceny's study bases democratic success on the Polity 
democracy measure, which employs a narrow, procedural definition of democracy 
focused on the relative openness of a country's political institutions. Second, in a previous 
study, we find many problems with the statistical analyses that form the basis of Peceny’s 
"forcing them to be free" hypothesis (Pearson, Walker, and Stern 2003).  Third, we 
believe that some of the cases that are deemed to entail "successful" democratization are 
not really so successful after all. 
Thus, our paper will progress in the following manner.  First, we explicate and 
evaluate Peceny's "forcing them to be free" argument.  Second, we summarize our own 
assessment of Peceny's statistical models, which purportedly demonstrate the 
contributions of imposed "free and fair election" measures on long-term democratization 
in target countries. We find support for some but by no means all of Peceny’s major 
conclusions.  These two parts of the paper lead to the third and most central part of this 
paper: a closer look at the actual democratic status of several countries that Peceny deems 
to be successful combinations of U.S. intervention and forced free and fair elections. 
These case studies suggest that in many cases the intervention targets have not as yet 
transitioned into thorough or stable democracies.  
2. Peceny's "Forcing Them To Be Free" Thesis: A Closer Look   
Peceny’s findings purportedly show that it was mainly those U.S. military 
interventions that pressed for “free and fair” elections that enhanced democracy. In other 
words, American interventions do not necessarily liberalize, and might even uphold 
repression. It is the cases where Washington decidedly seeks liberalization where the 
door has been opened to successful and lasting democratization.3  To quote the essence of 
his findings (1999b: 577): 
Recent literature on international relations is overwhelmed by studies of 
conflict behavior on democracies. Much less attention has been paid, 
however, to the impact of international conflict on democracy. This paper 
argues that a specific type of conflict behavior, U.S. military intervention, 
can have a positive impact on democracy in target states, but only if the 
U.S. promotes free and fair elections during its interventions.    
Even with this proviso, however, the link between military intervention and 
democratic outcomes in target states remains an open question both methodologically and 
conceptually.  First, Peceny's benchmark for successful democratization is the Polity III 
democracy score, which concentrates on institutional aspects of democracy, such as the 
role of the legislature, executive, and elections.4  While these are adequate measures of 
procedural democracy, such scores underemphasize performance in other constitutional 
 areas, including the rule of law and status of the judiciary, as well as observance of 
human rights and civil liberties (e.g., the free press).   
Further, the countries showing democratic improvement after forced "free and 
fair" elections are relatively few in number, and are concentrated in Central America and 
Southeast Asia.  Aside from questions regarding the extent of democratic change there is 
also uncertainty about whether it was really U.S. pressure that accounted for the noted 
improvements, or whether democratization occurred due to other events or reasons such 
as economic growth, the impact of intergovernmental organizations, regional political 
trends or patterns, generational change in leadership, or the effects of regional and local 
wars.   
Further, the fact that direct American pressure and involvement in these states are 
supposedly required for the democratization effect to take hold may in some 
circumstances violate international legal obligations and norms concerning non-
interference in states’ internal affairs.  To posit that the U.S. might have to arrange for 
elections as an occupying power can build in certain neo-colonial assumptions, which 
some would argue is inherently undemocratic. It is one thing for small states, neutrals, 
Inter-Governmental Organizations (IGOs), or Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) 
to supervise and design elections; it is another matter politically for a dominant power to 
oversee the process.  The degree of local volition in such arrangements, as in modifying 
the procedures culturally or including all factions of the political spectrum, would appear 
to be limited.  Therefore, the idea that the United States can "force" countries to be 
democratic is not one that is consistent with the principal of non-intervention that has 
dominated international relations for the past several hundred years. 
Despite our concerns about the viability of the concept of militarily imposed 
democratization, Peceny’s care and willingness to test counter-arguments raise interest in 
his findings and impel us to further investigate the validity of the "forcing them to be 
free" thesis.  He notes that, “While U.S.-sponsored electoral processes at times lead to a 
hollow formalism void of democratic content, they often help strengthen centrist political 
parties and moderate reformist interest groups and encourage autocratic elites to accept 
more democratic rules of the political game.” (1999b, 550-551) Such changes supposedly 
produce regimes that have “surpassed the procedural minimum to be considered 
democracies.” (550) We must, therefore, look more carefully to see whether the resulting 
regimes indeed more closely resemble “hollow formalism,” or whether they rise above 
the threshold of full democracy.  To accomplish this, we will reexamine Peceny’s 
findings, as well as discover whether his "successful" cases of democratization can stand 
up to a variety of alternate benchmarks for what constitutes a successful democratic 
polity.    
The controversy over what exactly constitutes full-blown democracy continues to 
make its imprint on the literature, but one must agree that liberal or pluralistic democracy 
is extremely complex and multi-faceted, including such questions as granting of minority 
rights and the limits to state intrusion on individual liberties.5  We do not wish to set the 
bar of democratic status unreasonably high, or to overlook important progress especially 
 for fledgling democracies; but we also do not believe it would be wise to ignore severe 
abuses in formalistically or nominally democratic states.   
The primary thrust of this paper, then, will be to provide a series of brief case 
studies of the status of democratic development in some of the countries deemed to be 
successful targets of liberalizing interventions.  The next section discusses our 
reexamination of Peceny's "large-N" analysis of the effects of intervention and forced 
free and fair elections on successful democratization. 
Reevaluating Peceny's Analysis 
 In an earlier examination of Peceny's work (Pearson, Walker, and Stern 2003), we 
identified two major problems with the author’s analyses. First, we argued that his 
empirical findings regarding the effectiveness of imposed democratization rest on shaky 
empirical ground.  Second, we found that if a variety of alternative measures of 
democratization are used as the benchmark for successful democratization, "forcing them 
to be free" does not appear to be nearly as successful a strategy as one might be led to 
believe if only the Polity measure is used as a standard for democratic success. The 
following is a summary of our findings. 
A.  Empirical analysis of Peceny's model  
In our empirical analyses, we first questioned the robustness of Peceny's claim 
that 14 of the 20 countries (70 percent) experiencing “liberalizing” interventions by the 
United States in the postwar period could be coded as "successful" cases of imposed 
democracy as of 1993.  Of these 20 countries, Peceny thus finds that only six are not 
"successes" (Angola, China, Iraq, Laos, Libya, and Vietnam), while admitting the 
possibility that four additional countries that were deemed to be successful transitions 
perhaps should not be included-- namely the defeated Axis states (Austria, Germany, 
Italy, and Japan). The profound nature of the wartime interventions in these countries 
would appear to constitute a separate category of “forced democracy,” in which 
completely defeated, essentially prostrate foes were provided with a full constitutional 
“make over” in the context of multinational occupation in some cases 
 
Table 1.  Targets of U.S.  "Democratic" 
 Interventions, 1945-1993
 Successes Failures
Austria a Angola
Cambodia b China
 Dom. Republic Iraq
El Salvador Laos
Germanya Libya
Greece Vietnam
 
Grenada c
 
 Honduras
Italy a
Japan a
Korea
 Nicaragua
 Panama
Philippines
a Former Axis country occupied after WWII
b
 Originally coded as democratic by Polity III, 
but later recoded as non-democratic for 1993.
c Does not appear in the Polity III data set. Peceny
nevertheless includes Grenada in his list of 
target countries.
 and nearly no effective opposition, and with a full array of financial, military, civil, 
bureaucratic, and political assistance and tutelage.  This appears to be far different from 
the context of interventions during and after the Cold War, in which both international 
and domestic opposition still existed, constitutions may or may not have been fully 
rewritten, and aid was sporadic.  If one accepts this exclusion of the Axis powers, then, 
only 10 of the 16 countries (63 percent) that experienced U.S. intervention with a push 
for free and fair elections during the 1944-1993 period remained democratic in 1993, 
according to the Polity measure.   
In fact, a revised version of the Polity data set, Polity IV, determined that another 
of the "successful" cases, Cambodia, had previously been miscoded as a democracy by 
Polity III and, despite progress from its genocidal past, was actually rated an autocracy in 
1993. Therefore, when we re-examined which cases of “forcing them to be free” 
interventions were successful, we found only 9 of 16 countries (56 percent) experiencing 
"democratizing" interventions could deemed to be successes as of 1993. This diminishing 
ratio turns out to be not much better than one could expect from a coin flip, which is 
clearly not a particularly high success rate. Combined with the small 'n' involved in this 
finding, we do not think the data necessarily bear out the conclusion that intervention 
combined with democratization is a particularly successful strategy.  Indeed, among the 
nine cases that remain successes with this recalculation of success criteria (Dominican 
Republic, El Salvador, Greece, Grenada, Honduras, Korea, Nicaragua, Panama, and the 
Philippines) are several countries that do not on their faces appear to be consolidated 
democracies.  We will discuss the situation in many of these countries in the case study 
section below.  
Peceny also creates a statistical model of democratization for a global sample of 
countries.  His analysis includes those countries that experienced U.S. intervention, 
whether there was a push for "free and fair" elections or not (during the 1944-1993 era) 
as well as those that did not experience intervention.  The study includes a total of 160 
countries.  The model includes U.S. intervention and forced "free and fair elections" in a 
model along with other factors commonly attributed as agents of democratic change, 
including previous history of democracy, history of civil and international war, and 
whether the U.S. supported or opposed the previous regime. The dependent variable in 
this logit model had only two possible outcomes--democratic and non-democratic--as 
determined by the country's Polity III democracy score in 1993.  Any score with a score 
of six or above in 1993 was deemed to constitute a successful case of democratization. 
For a U.S. intervention to include support for free and fair elections according to Peceny's 
classification, it must involve all or some of the following: supervising of election 
processes, financing the elections, designing the electoral system, mediating among 
contending parties over conditions for elections, and observing and evaluating elections 
(Peceny 1999b, 566).  Peceny finds that his conception of forced free and fair elections 
exhibits a significant positive impact on the development of democracy in the context of 
other key influences in the post-World War II setting.6  However, U.S. interventions in 
general (i.e., including cases where elections were not promoted during the occupation 
period) either worked against democracy or had no discernable impact in the various 
 statistical models presented.  Somehow, the combination of intervention and democratic 
pressure appears to increase the likelihood that countries in the sample will be democratic 
in 1993. 
While Peceny's model of democratization does indeed reveal a statistically 
significant effect for the "free and fair elections" variable, we argued that two factors 
weaken this supposedly "robust" finding. First, the model’s best predictor of democracy 
in 1993 is whether a country was democratic in 1944 (59 percent of cases correctly 
predicted in logit).  Adding the forced democratization variables (intervention and 
pressure for "free and fair" elections) into this model improves the success rate only 2.5 
percent, from just over 59 percent to a little less than 62 percent—thus, the democratic 
status of four additional countries can be predicted with the inclusion of these two 
variables.   
Second, while the "free and fair elections" variable has a statistically significant 
effect in Peceny's full model, it fails to achieve statistical significance in an alternate 
model in which the presence of democracy in 1944 is the only other explanatory 
(independent) variable.  Only when the dummy variable for the presence of civil war is 
included do "free and fair elections" achieve statistical significance. This suggests that 
rather than having some direct effect, there is some more complex relationship among the 
variables that cannot be captured in a linear model.  Moreover, in our previous work 
(Pearson, Walker, and Stern 2003), we found that the presence of the intervention and 
forced democratization variables does not add much to our ability to predict which 
countries were democratic in 1993.  Therefore, we must conclude that Peceny's model 
does not indeed statistically justify the validity of the "forcing them to be free" variables 
(military intervention and a push for free and fair elections) as highly salient factors 
contributing directly to a higher probability for democratization, at least as compared to a 
country’s previous democratic status.7 
To summarize, while Peceny's results suggest that the impact of US interventions 
on behalf of free and fair elections has a lasting positive impact on democratization, upon 
closer inspection we have found reasons to qualify these effects.  Apparently, regime type 
in the period immediately preceding the years included in Peceny's study is the factor that 
drives this model of democratization--not simply whether a country experienced a 
liberalizing U.S. intervention.  It does appear, however, that some combination of civil 
war and U.S. intervention may interact in a complex way with forced free and fair 
elections to predict democratic success with slightly more accuracy.  
B. Reconceptualizing Democratization  
We also believe that Peceny's criteria for democratic success is somewhat one- 
dimensional, since the only requirement for a country to be considered "successfully" 
democratized was to have a Polity III score of 6 (out of a best possible score of 10) or 
higher in 1993. Pearson, Walker, and Stern (2003, discussed above), subsequently 
decided to re-estimate Peceny's model using two alternative indicators for successful 
governance.  The first indicator, the Freedom House measure, is designed to capture a 
 broad range of political rights and civil liberties. Freedom House classifies countries as 
either "free," "partially free," or "not free." In order to make this variable resemble 
Peceny's dichotomous "democracy" variable, we recoded the "partially free" cases as "not 
free," since Peceny suggests that countries must have surpassed the “procedural 
minimum” to be considered democracies.8  The second measure we used to tap an 
alternate conception of successful political development consistent with a high level of 
democracy was the Political Terror Scale, a five-point measure of human rights violations 
(or more specifically, state terror) created from human coding of Amnesty International 
annual country reports.9  We recoded this measure into a dichotomous variable, with 
scores of one and two (consistent with democratic development) coded as "1" 
(democratic) while scores of three, four, and five are coded as "0" (not consistent with 
democratic development). Given the strong link between democracy and human rights,10 
we believe that this measure is a useful alternative for measuring the level of political 
development in a given society.   
The results of these alternative models show mixed support for the thesis that 
democratic-minded military interventions lead to democratic governance.  When 1993 is 
used as the cutoff year for the study, we found the "free and fair elections" variable does 
not have a statistically significant effect on Freedom House scores, although its sign is 
positive.  However, when 2001 was treated as the cutoff year (to bring the findings 
somewhat more up to date), "free and fair elections" do have a positive and statistically 
significant effect on political rights.  Moving to the effects on the human rights measure, 
we found that military intervention and a push for democratic elections does not lead to 
improved Political Terror Scale scores, regardless of whether 1993 or 2001 is treated as 
the cutoff year.  Although the sign is in the direction that Peceny would expect (i.e., a 
positive relationship between support for free and fair elections and better human rights), 
the "free and fair election" variable is not statistically significant for either cutoff year.  
Thus, by re-estimating Peceny's models using alternative measures for successful 
democratic transition, we did not find evidence that U.S. interventions combined with 
pressure for free and fair elections increases the likelihood that countries will observe the 
full array of constitutional rights assumed in many definitions of democracy.   
 Although statistical analyses can be useful to offer a general picture of how 
successful policies are, one can gain further important insight into the substantive impact 
of such policies through the use of case studies.  In the next section, we examine in detail 
the political situation in several of the countries that Peceny deems to be successful 
targets of U.S.-imposed democracy in the post-war period. 
Case Studies 
In the previous section, we scrutinized Peceny's analyses of the effects of 
liberalizing U.S. interventions, and found that such a policy is not as likely to lead to 
successful democratic transition as the author holds them to be--particularly if one 
chooses to use alternative criteria for what constitutes successful democratization.   
However, we decided to look more carefully at some of the states Peceny purports 
to have made a successful transition under U.S. pressure to see whether they have in 
recent years experienced sustained, stable, and high levels of democratization, as Peceny 
 indicate they would.  In these brief case studies to follow we focus on six countries in 
which the interventions and the push for democratization were more recent, due to the 
better availability of information during the last few decades.  The six countries are El 
Salvador, Nicaragua, Honduras, Panama, Grenada, and Philippines.  For comparison, we 
also briefly mention some cases where democracy seems to have emerged in the 
developing world without U.S. interventions. 
El Salvador 
The U.S. intervention in question (i.e., the one that involved pressure for free and 
fair elections) occurred in El Salvador from 1981-1991.  Only toward the end of this 
period was there significant pressure for relatively free elections.  The civil war between 
the FMLN rebels and the government ended in a peace agreement in 1992.  El Salvador 
subsequently became a democratic republic governed by a president and an 84-member 
unicameral Legislative Assembly.  There was improvement in Political Rights (from 4 to 
3) and Civil Liberties (also 4 to 3) in El Salvador's Freedom House scores between 1992 
and 2001, but according to these measures the country was still designated as only 
partially free at the end of this period (The Freedom House Political Rights and Civil 
Liberties measures are based on 7-point scales, with "1" representing the best score and 
"7" representing the worst).  The Amnesty International Political Terror Scale score 
improved from 4 to 3 during the same time period.  [The Political Terror scale is based on 
a five-point scale, with "1" representing the best level of respect for human rights (e.g., 
little or no presence of extra judicial imprisonments and killings, and stable rule of law 
and "5" representing the worst level of respect (e.g., the presence of mass killings, 
widespread torture, and so forth)].  However, the Polity IV scores remained at 7 during 
the 1993-2001 time period.  Thus, though the Polity measure places El Salvador as being 
democratic, and though its political rights scores improved, the depth of the country’s 
democratic development is questionable.11 
 
 The human rights and civil liberties situation in El Salvador during the post-1992 
period also was characterized by a discouraging reported increase in military intimidation 
of opposition politicians and members of church and grassroots organizations 
representing peasants, women, and repatriated refugees.  Repeated human rights 
violations included death squad killings, murder, disappearance, assassinations, 
kidnappings, illegal detentions, torture, violations of the laws of war, attacks on the 
civilian population, forced recruitment, and restrictions on freedom of movement.  This 
resulted in continuing setbacks in investigations of major human rights assaults and rape 
by the civil defense units, army, security forces and so-called death squads associated 
with them.12  Indeed, opposition leader Francisco Velis Castellanos was murdered prior 
to the 1994 elections.   
 
Throughout much of the period of the 1990s the Salvadoran judicial system 
remained fraught with problems of incompetence and corruption. The judiciary's 
inefficiency resulted in lengthy pretrial detentions and long delays in trials.  El Salvador's 
judiciary failed to prosecute those responsible for human rights crimes, most notably the 
soldiers in the Jesuit murder case in which six priests and two women who were slain 
 during the country's 12-year civil war.  The Supreme Court made some progress in 
cleaning up the judiciary, but did not move quickly to discipline or dismiss corrupt or 
incompetent judges (Keesing’s Archives 1991-93).  Both the Truth Commission and an 
ad hoc commission established by the peace accords to evaluate the human rights record 
of the ESAF officer corps identified weaknesses in the judiciary and recommended 
solutions, the most dramatic being the replacement of all Supreme Court magistrates. 
This recommendation was fulfilled in 1994 when an entirely new court was elected, but 
weaknesses reportedly persisted.  The country thus has an independent judiciary and 
Supreme Court, but clearly was still in the process of evolving toward democratic norms 
at the end of the time period covered by Peceny's (1999b) study.13 
 
Honduras 
 
The relevant U.S. Military intervention occurred from 1982-1990, again with only 
belated liberalization pressure reported.  Honduras’ Polity score was 6 in 1993 and 7 in 
2001, meaning it stood only at the threshold of democratic status.  Under the new 1982 
constitution, Honduras was declared to be a constitutional democracy.  Freedom House 
ratings both remained at 3 in 2003, meaning that the country was still designated as only 
"partially free."  There was some improvement in the Amnesty Political Terror Scale 
ratings between 1990 and 2001.   
Within the period of study both presidential and legislative elections were held in 
1990, 1993 and 1997, and were accepted by all parties as having been free and fair. 
Rafael Leonardo Cellejas won the post peace accords presidential election, taking office 
in January 1990. However, governmental corruption led voters to support the opposition 
center-right Liberal Party of Honduras (PLH), which convincingly defeated the ruling 
right-wing National Party of Honduras (PNH) in the November 28 balloting. The election 
of noted human rights defender, Carlos Roberto Reina, in November 1993, reaffirmed the 
stability of Honduran democratic processes. The new administration made several efforts 
to guarantee constitutional rights and establish civilian authority over the security forces 
(Keesing’s 1993, 1997).   
 
As with El Salvador, despite considerable procedural democratic improvement, 
Hondurans continued to suffer human rights violations at the hands of the police and 
military, including: murder, torture, illegal detention, threats and harassment, violence, 
extra-judicial execution, disappearance, societal discrimination against women, abuse of 
street children, and discrimination against indigenous people perpetuated by the security 
forces following the transition to democracy. In Honduras abuse of authority, excessive 
use of force, and torture in custody were still common practices by the armed forces and 
the military-controlled police (FUSEP).  Structural problems in the administration of 
justice and the vast economic and political power of the armed forces shielded most 
military violators of human rights from prosecution.  Military actions were designed to 
convince the populace that a civilian body could not function as well as one controlled by 
the armed forces.  Security forces evidently committed gross human rights violations 
with impunity, especially in rural areas, with reports of torture and mistreatment while in 
police custody.  Forced recruitment by the army was often a discriminatory practice, 
which disproportionably affected the poor in rural areas.14  
 Przeworski (2000: 35) states that in countries such as Honduras and Thailand, 
civilian rule is but a thin veneer over military power exercised by defrocked generals; 
indeed Honduras has experienced four historical “transitions” between democracy and 
dictatorship.  The judiciary is generally independent, but often ineffective and subject to 
outside influence.15 As with El Salvador, the weakness, inefficiency, and corruption 
inherent in the criminal justice system remained perhaps the largest obstacles to 
establishing the rule of law. The absence of prosecution of perpetrators among the 
security forces and members of the economic and official elite, exacerbated by a weak, 
under funded, and often corrupt judicial system, contributed to human rights problems. 
The judicial system continued to deny swift and impartial justice to prisoners awaiting 
trial. Judicial reform was attempted, including the replacement of incompetent, untrained 
judges (jueces de paz) with those educated in the law (jueces de letras), the removal of 
corrupt judges, and the de-politicization of the judiciary.  Little progress was reported 
through the mid-nineties (see Keesing’s Archives 1991, 1994). 
 
 
Nicaragua 
 
The U.S. military intervened in Nicaragua between 1981 and 1990.  Throughout 
most of the 1980s Washington funded a massive paramilitary contra campaign to unseat 
the leftist Sandinista government, hardly an innocuous lead-in to subsequent U.S. 
pressure for free and fair elections.  The war finally ended in agreements for both sides to 
compete electorally, and the Sandinistas slipped from power. Nicaragua’s Polity score 
was 8 in 2001, a relatively high level.  Freedom House ratings remained “partly free," as 
both the Political Rights and Civil Liberties measures were at 3 in 2001, and there was a 
greatly improved Amnesty score by 2001.  
 
The October 20, 1996 presidential, legislative, and mayoral elections were judged 
free and fair by international observers and by the groundbreaking national electoral 
observer group Etica y Transparencia (Ethics and Transparency) despite a number of 
irregularities due largely to logistical difficulties and a baroquely complicated electoral 
law. The first transfer of power in recent Nicaraguan history from one democratically 
elected president to another took place on January 10, 1997, when the Aleman 
government was inaugurated. In November 2000, Nicaragua held municipal elections--
the country's third free and fair election since 1990. 
 
Polarization between ex-contras and former Sandinistas affected political 
competition and also led to acts of violence such as hostage taking early in the 1990s.  A 
weak central government, including a feeble judicial system, could not fully contain the 
situation. The Popular Sandinista Army (EPS) and police engaged in an excessive and 
disproportionate use of force in several instances when responding to rearmed groups, 
striking workers, and peaceful protesters. The general reign of impunity and the inability 
of the Nicaraguan state to administer justice continued to be the greatest impediments to 
an improved human rights situation. The Sandinistas as well as the former contras and 
anti-Sandinista forces claimed that the other side had systematically killed hundreds of 
 their supporters. Criminal and political violence continued to plague the Nicaraguan 
countryside.16  
  
The highly polarized political environment has shaped the human rights situation 
in Nicaragua since the civil war.  Members of the security forces reportedly committed 
extra-judicial killings, abuse of detainees, torture, arbitrary arrests and excessive and 
disproportionate use of force against peaceful protesters.  Prison and police holding cell 
conditions remained harsh, although they improved somewhat across the decade of the 
1990s.  Security forces arrested and detained citizens at an increased rate during the 
decade. Lengthy pretrial detention and long delays in trials remained problems along with 
violence against children and discrimination against women and indigenous people.  
Though there were no reports of political prisoners (due to a lack of administrative 
coordination between judges and the penal system), many prisoners remained in prison 
after their scheduled release.  The general reign of impunity and the inability of the 
Nicaraguan state to administer justice continued to be the greatest obstacles to an 
improved human rights situation and rule of law.17  
 
In an ongoing campaign to reduce incompetence and corruption in the judiciary, 
the Supreme Court removed an additional 10 judges during the first half of 1999, 
bringing the total removed since the campaign began in 1997 to 104--more than one-third 
of the 300 judges in the system. The Judicial Inspector's office received 238 official 
complaints against lawyers, judges, and judicial functionaries (Department of State 
Human Rights Reports for 2000. http://www.humanrights-usa.net/reports.nicaragua.htm).  
On the whole, though, in addition to its relatively solid electoral record, Nicaragua 
seemed to be taking many effective steps to improve the administration of justice and the 
rule of law. 
 
Panama 
 
U.S. military interventions occurred in Panama in 1959, 1964 and 1989-1992.  
The final intervention included the ouster of the then-leader Manuel Noriega.  Panama’s 
1993 Polity score, the year after the intervention, was 8.  The 2001 Polity score rose to 9.   
The Freedom House measures both improved between 1988 and 2003, as Political Rights 
improved from 5 to 1, and Civil Liberties improved from 5 to 2.  However, in terms of 
popular democracy, Panama and Guatemala shared the lowest level of electoral 
participation in Latin America in the 1990’s with fewer than 45 percent of registered 
voters exercising their right to vote (Payne et al. 2002). 
 
The constitution was amended in 1994 and Ernesto Perez Balladares was sworn in 
as President on September 1, 1994 after an internationally monitored election accepted as 
free and fair.  Soon, however, there were reports that his government was tainted by 
Colombian drug money.18 On May 2, 1999, Mireya Moscoso, the widow of former 
President Arnulfo Arias Madrid, defeated PRD candidate Martin Torrijos, son of the late 
dictator Omar Torrijos. These elections also were considered to be free and fair 
(http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2030.htm).  As in other parts of Latin America, though, 
Panama has undergone several (five) transitions between democracy and dictatorship 
 since the country’s inception, indicating continued high potential for political and social 
instability (Przeworski et al., 2000).  
 
The Panamanian government generally appeared to respect the human rights of its 
citizens during the 1990s.  However, serious problems remained in several areas, 
including the administration of justice. The Panamanian media reportedly remained 
subject to political pressure, libel suits, and punitive action by the government. There 
were no reports of political or other extra-judicial killings, politically motivated 
disappearances, torture and other cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment.19 
  
According to the Panamanian government's own figures, at least eighty percent of 
the more than 3,500 prisoners in jail have not been convicted or even, in many cases, 
formally charged; the government’s strategy of identifying and processing the cases of 
those held longest in prison without trial had no discernible impact.20   
 
In general the government was beset with mismanagement, political cronyism, 
corruption and a lack of institutional efficiency. The Panamanian government's poor 
performance in improving the administration of justice is frequently explained by the lack 
of funds available in a country with pressing social-welfare needs and continuing 
economic dislocation caused by the U.S. boycott prior to the invasion/intervention.  
 
As in the other cases discussed so far, the judicial system remains largely 
unreformed.  The judiciary appears subject to political manipulation.  The police 
frequently failed to follow legal requirements in the conduct of their duties and judges 
appeared susceptible particularly to favoring the affluent. The most common 
manifestations of judicial misconduct involved shelving of politically charged cases or 
ruling in favor of the politically connected party and the willingness of several judges to 
sentence defendants without a public defender.21  Resistance also persisted against 
prosecuting the most serious human rights violations committed by members of the 
former Noriega regime (Keesing’s Archive, 1999). 
 
The picture in Panama reflects the situation in Central America in that while 
many of the formal trappings of democracy are present, it is much less clear to what 
degree it has been institutionalized.  Although considerable electoral and procedural 
progress was evident in many of the Central American cases during the 1990s, less 
encouraging was the disillusionment with democracy as evidenced by regional public 
opinion surveys.  Over the course of the 1990s, support for democracy dropped from 63.6 
to 42.7 percent in Nicaragua, 69.9 to 34.3 percent in Panama, and 62 to 27.3 percent in El 
Salvador. In 2001, the portion of respondents who expressed confidence in democratic 
political institutions stood at 31 percent (Payne et al., 2002). 
 
In addition, civil liberties abuses, sporadic violence, and the unresolved problem 
of judicial integrity have persisted in the region.  Thus it is fair to say that although 
progress has been made with regard to the level of democratic development in Central 
America, the democratic regimes there are nonetheless flawed and have not yet proven to 
 be stable.  Furthermore, many would argue that the price paid for these developments was 
high due to the military and militia involvement, high in human lives lost.   
 
Grenada 
 
U.S. military intervention in Grenada occurred in 1983.  No Polity scores exist for 
Grenada (although Peceny codes it as “democratic” for the year 1993).  Freedom House 
indicated an improvement of 5 points in the Political Rights measure and 3 points in the 
Civil Liberties measure, which means the country moved from the "not free" to the "free" 
category between 1982 and 2001. Amnesty scores indicated minimal violations by 2001.   
 
Grenada has not suffered a formal civil war, although it did experience political 
disruption in the early 1980s.  Grenadians enjoyed a wide range of civil and political 
rights during the late 1980s and 1990s.  Freedom of speech and press, peaceful assembly 
and association, religion, respect for the integrity of the person, right of citizens to change 
their government and to organize independent labor unions were constitutionally 
guaranteed and respected. There were no reports of politically motivated or other extra-
judicial killings, politically motivated disappearances or abductions, torture and other 
cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment, arbitrary arrest, detention, or 
exile.  There also was no evidence of official discrimination in health care, employment, 
or education.  Women frequently earn less than men performing the same work, but such 
wage differences were less marked for the more highly paid jobs. There were occasional 
allegations of abuse by the police.22 
 
Grenada’s judiciary, a part of the Eastern Caribbean legal system, is highly 
regarded and independent.   Final appeal may be made to the Privy Council in the United 
Kingdom. There are no military or political courts.  The right to a fair public trial is 
provided for by law and is observed in practice. The attorney has the right to be present 
during interrogation and may advise the accused.  An accused person has the right to 
confront his/her accuser.  In criminal cases the court will appoint attorneys for indigents 
only in cases of murder or other capital crimes. In other criminal cases that reach the 
appellate stage, the court will similarly appoint a lawyer to represent the accused if (s)he 
was not previously represented or reappoint the defendant's earlier counsel if the 
appellant can no longer afford the lawyer's services.23  Hence in general it appears that 
Grenada’s democratic status is relatively secure, while many impediments to civil rights 
and social democracy still threaten Central American nations. 
 
Philippines 
Post World War II U.S. military intervention in the Philippines occurred in the 
1949-1952 and 1985-1988 time periods.  Philippine ratings in Polity data have remained 
at a respectable 8 in recent years.  Freedom House scores improved by one point in 
political rights and two points in civil liberties, moving the country from “not free” to 
“free” between 1984 and 2001, in the wake of the Ferdinand Marcos regime, which of 
course had been heavily supported for many years by the U.S.  Meanwhile, Amnesty 
scores floated between 3 and 4 during the late 1980s and 1990s.   
 
 The Philippines has a long and checkered history of democratic development.  
Certainly the forms of democracy, while sometimes breached, have for the most part held 
reasonably well.  Yet the country also has experienced autocracy and numerous and long- 
lasting insurgencies which have tested the limits of democracy.  In 1990, for example, 
Human Rights Watch reported that the Philippine military, together with the official 
paramilitary force, CAFGU (Citizens Armed Forces -- Geographical Unit), engaged in 
summary executions and the disappearance of suspected supporters of the New People’s 
Army (NPA) and the Muslim insurgency, the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF). 
Suspected rebels were frequently arrested without warrant, held for long periods in 
solitary confinement or incommunicado detention, and occasionally tortured.  
 
Developments on the legal front also were not wholly encouraging. The infamous 
Presidential Decree 1850 (left over from the Marcos years), which gave military courts 
jurisdiction over all military personnel including those accused of human rights offenses 
against civilians, remained in effect despite congressional efforts to repeal it. For the 
most part, prosecutions of human rights offenders went nowhere, although 16 officers 
were finally convicted of the 1983 murder of Senator Benigno Aquino, Jr.  In 1990 the 
right to be protected against arbitrary arrest, guaranteed by the 1987 Constitution, was 
eroded when the Supreme Court ruled that suspected Communists could be arrested 
without warrant.  Also in 1990, regular forces were responsible for one particularly brutal 
massacre. On August 3 in New Passi, Tacurong, Sultan Kudarat, 19 civilians ranging in 
age from one to 72 were executed by members of the 38th Infantry Battalion based in 
Esperanza, Sultan Kudarat, apparently in revenge for the MNLF killing of two soldiers 
some weeks earlier.  Human rights monitors and lawyers continued to receive death 
threats, apparently from military-linked groups. 
 
 The Philippine government's human rights record during and after 1991 was 
mixed.  Legal and legislative developments in 1991 were for the most part encouraging. 
The government enacted several reforms reflecting the recommendations of numerous 
national and international human rights groups, particularly those of the U.N. Working 
Group on Enforced or Involuntary Disappearances, which issued its report on the 
Philippines in January.  Still, military impunity remained a problem. In a widely 
publicized case fifteen soldiers were acquitted of having massacred nineteen civilians in 
November 1990, despite eyewitnesses and physical evidence that strongly linked the unit 
to the massacre. 
 According to both the government's Commission on Human Rights (CHR) and 
nongovernmental human rights groups, violations declined on all fronts. However, 
reports of abuses including disappearances, extra-judicial killings, incommunicado 
detention and warrant-less arrests continued.  Government forces were not alone in 
committing abuses, as over a dozen disappearances of persons associated with 
community organizations suspected of rebel connections were reported.  
The Presidential Human Rights Committee, a cabinet-level consultative body 
created by President Corazon Aquino in December 1988 as a response to the problem of 
 involuntary disappearances, eclipsed the CHR in 1991 by launching several high-profile 
probes to investigate human rights abuses.  
The Philippines, therefore, though classed as “free” by Freedom House and 
ranked comparatively highly on many democracy scales, has recurrent democratic 
challenges and continuing insurgency concerns.   
 
 
5.  Summary and Conclusion 
 
 The overall pattern of these findings appears again to show mixed but not 
definitive support for the forced democracy thesis. While substantial progress was noted 
in several Central American, Caribbean, and Southeast Asian states, significant lingering 
deficiencies (particularly in the rule of law) were troubling, and an erosion of popular 
support for democracy was noted.  All of these outcomes seem to call for caution in 
interpreting the interventions discussed here as clear democratic success stories. Further, 
one might note the obvious possibility that states can progress significantly toward 
democracy by these same criteria without having undergone great power intervention, as 
evidenced by the following states during the period 1973-2003: Benin, Botswana, Brazil, 
Cape Verde, Chile, Guyana, Indonesia, Lesotho, Mali, Mongolia, Peru, Thailand, 
Uruguay, South Korea, Mexico, Namibia, New Guinea, Portugal, Senegal, and Sri Lanka.  
Add to these Albania, Argentina, Central African Republic, Ethiopia, Gabon, Hungary, 
Guinea Bissau, Ghana, Jordan, Malawi, Mozambique, Nigeria, Niger, Togo, Tanzania, 
and Uganda as states achieving “partially free” status during this time period.24  
 
 
Some of these states overcame considerable internal strife (e.g., Sri Lanka, 
Indonesia) and economic hardship (e.g., Guyana, Mali) to reach these levels, and some of 
course have teetered on the margin of maintaining their new status.  In general, however, 
it is not at all clear that U.S. intervention is necessary for such democratic advances, or 
that these advances are necessarily precluded by indigenous violence or hardship.  
 
 
In assessing the argument that democratically motivated interventions can lead to 
long-term democratic development in target countries, we note several important 
findings: 
o First, upon further review, Peceny's empirical finding that U.S. military intervention 
combined with an effort to promote free and fair elections leads to successful 
democratization would appear to be partially valid. Using Peceny’s own model and 
methodology, we found that the statistical significance of the "free and fair elections" 
variable is highly contextual and dependent upon the cases that are selected. By 
Peceny's own standards, only 9 out of 16 non-Axis countries that have been targets of 
U.S. democratic interventions since World War II were democratic at the end of 
1993. It cannot therefore be said with confidence that liberalizing interventions are 
more likely to lead to successful democratization than could be predicted by a random 
flip of a coin.  It is possible, as much of Peceny’s work suggests, that forced 
liberalization may in some cases lead to democratization. However, other variables 
 such as prior democratic history and the overall effect of civil wars appear to be 
determinative.  Our paper demonstrates that we must be conscious of the difference 
between movement in a democratic direction and actual achievement of sustained 
democratic practices in a given polity. 
o Second, when employing alternative measures of successful democratization, such as 
human rights, political rights and civil liberties, forced democratization does not have 
a consistent beneficial long-term effect. This finding leads us to the proposition that 
"forcing them to be free" may not be conducive to non-procedural democratic 
development.  Democracy is a complicated system, one consisting of a diverse array 
of features and resting particularly on strength of judicial independence.  Traditional 
empirical analyses of democratic development and transitions appear to neglect these 
important constitutional features dwelling heavily on electoral and procedural 
outcomes.  It appears that forced intervention, even on behalf of democracy, often 
fails to go far enough in establishing the full array of democratic norms and 
outcomes.  
Third, practically speaking, policy makers should not interpret Peceny's findings 
as a justification or call for interventions around the world with the purpose of imposing 
free and fair elections. To advocate such a strategy would be neither warranted on the 
basis of sound theoretical reasoning, nor consistent with empirical and historical research, 
nor indeed even necessarily congruent with international laws of sovereignty. We note 
that while impressive and substantial progress toward democracy has occurred in many 
states undergoing intervention, other factors inside the states can be instrumental, and 
democratic development can occur outside of or even as a negative reaction to the context 
of intervention.  Even in those cases in which Peceny identifies U.S. military 
interventions plus forced free and fair elections as having led to democracy, many are not 
as successful as might be indicated by narrow procedural indicators such as the Polity 
Index. 
 
 The forced democracy thesis obviously, then, requires further analysis. For 
example, the question remains as to whether pressure for free and fair elections is more 
effective and a better predictor of democracy if undertaken unilaterally by major powers 
or multilaterally by intergovernmental organizations—or by combinations of both in 
certain sequences of prolonged or abbreviated intervention. Peceny has explored issues of 
unilateral vs. multilateral intervention in some of his analyses, but it is necessary to 
distinguish more clearly, for example, between IGOs of a global vs. a regional nature. 
 
Arguably, democratizing pressure can be enhanced by ethnically related regional 
interventions (for example by the Arab League or Gulf Cooperation Council in the 
Middle East) as compared to global organizations or great powers.  Nor do we as yet 
know whether some combination of traditional local (e.g., the inter-tribal councils of 
Afghanistan) and Western democratic forms produce better outcomes than others.  
Certainly there are many electoral options to explore, in forms of federalism, 
consociational power sharing, majoritarian, proportional or weighted voting schemes.  
We do not know yet if one form of free electoral pressure produces more democratic 
staying power than others, or what is required for the reforms to be accepted as authentic 
and indigenous.  These are all worthy questions for further research.  
 
  
 
                                                 
Notes 
 
1
 See Barrington Moore (1993) and Rueschemeyer, Stephens, and Stephens (1993) for two examples of 
works that discuss the complicated nature of democratization. 
2
 One might argue, however, historical interpretation here is tenuous, since Cuba itself was hardly allowed 
to be fully independent in the subsequent years (repeated U.S. interventions and growing economic 
domination and corruption).  The fact of prolonged military occupation interacted with whatever 
liberalization attempts existed in the former Spanish colonies to promote distrust of the electoral outcomes.  
3
 Distinguishing this outcome from a mere tautology, Peceny (1999b:558) argues that free and fair elections 
are but one aspect of Polity III democratic measures-- scores between 6 and 10, the range adopted for a 
score of “democracy”-- but by no means the only aspect.  Other factors in the scoring include a reasonably 
powerful legislature and political (party) competition. 
 
4
 The analyses use Polity III rather than the updated Polity IV because at the time Peceny's article was 
published the updated data set was not yet available. 
 
5
 See, for instance, Linz and Stepan (1996) or Diamond (1999), for descriptions of the difficult process of 
democratization.  
6
 Peceny excludes years before 1944 from his analysis (1999b: 569), presumably because prior to World 
War II U.S. interventions and support for elections had a no discernable effect on developing democracies 
(even though one could argue, of course, that a prominent target like Mexico in the Wilson era 
subsequently underwent the trappings of a democratic revolution).  This pre-1944 analysis is therefore 
excluded from the presentation, although few reasons are given for the finding.  Perhaps the era of U.S. 
power dominance after 1945 is thought to equip American policy with the impact needed to bring about 
democracy when Washington puts its “mind” to it.  Perhaps this capability was not fully developed prior to 
1945, or perhaps it only emerged in the context of competition with the USSR for influence in the rapidly 
expanding “Third World” of newly independent states.  If so, in the post cold war era it will be interesting 
to see if the relationship of election support and democracy holds up, given the lack of Soviet competition, 
though perhaps terrorism or global market interests will provide the needed impetus to Washington’s 
efforts.   
7
 Essentially, in reevaluating Peceny’s statistical findings, we “peeled away the onion skin” of factors in his 
model predicting democratic status a year after interventions, and we found that the factor “democratic 
status in 1944” alone was the strongest predictor. Especially when interacting with the presence of a civil 
war.  Thus, while U.S. interventionist pressure for elections was statistically associated with democratic 
outcomes, it added relatively little to what prior democratic status alone would have predicted.  In other 
words, there is little improvement in predictive power gained in these models by adding the free and fair 
elections variable. 
8
 The Freedom House measure is actually a combination of two three-point measures, the Political Rights 
measure and the Civil Liberties measure.  Specific criteria for coding decisions have not been made 
available by Freedom House, although these measures are widely cited.  
9
 For more details about the coding of Amnesty International reports and the Political Terror Scale, see Poe, 
Tate and Keith (1999). For more information about the reports themselves, see www.amnesty.org. 
10
 See, for example, Poe and Tate (1994), Poe, Milner, and Leblang (1999). 
11
 Interestingly by way of comparison, Guatemala, a country with a very troubled past that received two 
non-liberalizing U.S. interventions in 1954 and 1987 (Peceny 1999b: 549, Table 2), emerged with strong 
electoral participation in 2003 in a vote which defeated the party associated with the prior U.S. backed 
                                                                                                                                                  
political strongman.  Thus a U.S. free and fair electoral push is by no means a necessary condition for 
electoral democracy in Central America. 
12
 Human Rights Watch reports:  http://www.hrw.org/reports/1990/WR90/AMER.BOU-
07.htm#P415_104868; http://www.hrw.org/reports/1992/WR92/AMW-08.htm#P559_200165, 
www.hrw.org/reports/1993/WR93/Amw-05.htm#P285_147071; 
www.hrw.org/reports/1994/WR94/Americas 04.htm#P228_119468; 
http://www.hrw.org/reports/1995/WR95/AMERICAS-05.htm#P271_100914; 
www.hrw.org/reports/1996/WR96/Americas-05.htm#P451_111820;   
http://www.whrnet.org/docs/issue-righttowork.html 17/07/03, 27148 bytes. 
In addition, discrimination against women, the disabled, and the indigenous remained serious problems in 
El Salvador.  The government took action to investigate, prosecute, and in some cases jail prominent 
citizens. Institutions such as the “Commission on Truth" and the Office of the Ombudsman for the Defense 
of Human Rights (PDDH), were established in the 1992 Constitution and peace accords to investigate 
major human rights cases. However, their investigative capacity remained limited due to resource 
constraints. 
13
 The process of replacing incompetent judges in the lower courts, and of strengthening the attorney 
general and public defender's offices, moved more slowly.  Action on peace accord-driven constitutional 
reforms designed to improve the administration of justice was largely completed in 1996 with legislative 
approval of several amendments and the revision of the Criminal Procedure Code. 
(http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2033.htm).   
14The government denied charges against the security forces but investigated allegations against 
neighborhood “vigilante” groups. 
http://www.hrw.org/reports/1992/WR92/AMW2.01.htm#P95_37305; 
http://www.hrw.org/reports/1994/WR94/Americas-07.htm#P383_185911; 
http://www.hrw.org/reports/1995/WR95/AMERICAS1996 
www.hrw.org/reports/1997/WR97/AMERICAS-06.htm#P320_132782; 
www.humanrights-usa.net/reports/honduras.html. 
15
 www.humanrights-usa.net/reports/honduras.html.   
16
 CENIDH (Centro Nicaraguense de Derechos Humanos) reported that the police had used excessive force 
in evicting striking workers from the central customs installations in Managua June of 1992, had beaten 
several workers in jail, and had lodged trumped-up charges against them to justify its behavior. In an earlier 
episode in September 1992, students and ex-EPS officers demonstrating peacefully during Independence 
Day celebrations (at which President Chamorro was present) were beaten by the police without 
provocation.  The U.S. State Department announced that it was releasing $50 million in economic aid to 
Nicaragua as of 1991.  
17
 http://www.humanrights-usa.net/reports/nicaragua.html. 
18
 Allegations published in the local newspaper La Prensa and in the UK weekly Economist of May 25 
prompted Pérez Balladares on June 21 to admit that he had "unwittingly" received two cheques totaling 
US$51,000 from a company headed by José Castrillon Henao, a Colombian who was arrested in Panama in 
April on charges that he headed the Cali cartel's sea-going cocaine export operation to the USA. Keesings 
report, vol. 42 1996. 
19
 Abuse by guards was a recurrent problem of the penal system. Overall prison conditions remained harsh, 
with occasional outbreaks of internal prison violence. Arbitrary detention and prolonged pretrial detention, 
overcrowded prisons, severe and systematic abuse of prisoners by their jailers remained endemic. 
www.humanrights-usa.net/reports/panama.html. See also, www.humanrights-usa.net/reports/panama.html; 
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2030.htm. 
20
 1991 http://www.hrw.org/reports/1992/WR92/AMW2-04.htm#P309_115377Americas Watch. 
21
 (http://www.hrw.org/reports/1992/WR92/AMW2-04.htm#P309_115377. 
22
 Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, U.S. Department of State country reports: 
http://dosfan.lib.uic.edu/ERC/democracy/1993_hrp_report/93hrp_report_ara/Grenada.html; 
http://dosfan.lib.uic.edu/ERC/democracy/1994_hrp_report/94hrp_report_ara/Grenada.html;  
http://www.usis.usemb.se/human/1996/west/grenada.html; 
http://dosfan.lib.uic.edu/ERC/democracy/1995_hrp_report/95hrp_report_ara/Grenada.html; 
http://www.humanrights-usa.net/reports/grenada.html. 
23
 http://www.usis.usemb.se/human/1996/west/grenada.html; 
                                                                                                                                                  
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2335.htm; 
http://dosfan.lib.uic.edu/ERC/democracy/1994_hrp_report/94hrp_report_ara/Grenada.html. 
24
 We have selected cases of conspicuously democratizing countries, i.e., those that have markedly 
improved in Freedom House rankings from 1973 to 2003, but did not experience U.S. military 
interventions. We selected states that were classified as “partially free” or “not free” in 1973 but attained a 
“free” ranking by the turn of the century and also improved in terms of both the Freedom House Political 
Rights and Civil liberties scores. We also looked at those cases that moved from “not free” in 1973 to 
“partially free” in 2003.  
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